

The Imagined Happiness or the Relationships between Work and Leisure¹

Let us begin this little journey of ours with a banal statement, a simple truism: everything we do, that is, all human action occurs or flows in time. Here it is not important for us to investigate whether this time constitutes an absolute reality that exists independently of any other circumstance; whether it is an inseparable relationship from space or even a mental or intellectual category without which we could not perceive things. Let us remain only with the sensitivity of its constant presence.

Now we can imagine the work of all individuals producing or maintaining, creating or remaking, no matter what, in all sectors of human activity. To all these productions and services, we call it a *social product*.

If we look at the past history of working time, and if we look at the recent history of that time, what we will see is that it depends on or results from three basic factors. First, it derives from the productive forces through which this social product is given - from the instruments, machines and other techniques used which, in turn, generate a certain productivity. In the second place, it is the consequence of the way society organizes itself to produce its goods (tribal, slave, feudal, capitalist, socialist), of its values and needs that are more proper or characteristic to it. In other words, working time is generated by the technical and social relations of production. Apparently, and this has been a widespread notion, the more advanced the productive forces and the more complex or evolved the

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social relations of production, the shorter the time required to obtain the social product. But our first "provocation" will be to say that the productive forces and social relations do not imply the automatic and continuous decline of working time. They are indispensable conditions, but not sufficient. They also depend on the political struggle within social relations, so that the reduction of productive time and its change into an apparently non-productive duration occurs.

In addition to the time spent creating or maintaining the social product - working or productive time - there is another that we live daily and that we feel as something residual or complementary. We are always so worried and influenced by the work that this other time seems to us to be so. It is the time when individuals do not make economically productive efforts - they are not in factories, in commercial activities, in services, in companies, in institutions. It is the period outside of direct work and what we could call non-productive time. Personally or subjectively, an individual may judge unproductive time productive for himself or herself; for example, when making home repairs, learning a new language, dedicating himself or herself to music, or relating to his or her children. But it is that we are setting as productive that obligatory and profitable time, from the economic point of view, in which material wealth potentially appropriated by the whole of society is created or preserved.

Is it clear? Not so much. It happens that this time called non-productive, residual or complementary, also acquires, for individuals and society, a value or productive function, in the economic sense. Because it regains our strength by allowing us to rest or have fun, and gives us conditions to consume (eat, travel, buy, for example). In other words, non-productive time still retains a socially productive value,

because it rescues the minimum conditions for the return of the living labor force and frees individuals for consumption. Now, since consumption is one of the inevitable moments in the economic circuit - producing, distributing, exchanging, consuming - then non-productive time becomes an indispensable time for production. It is its purpose and, simultaneously, its starting point.²

And we are so completely induced to consume that we do not even realize how immersed we are in what Baudrillard calls the formal liturgy of the object. "Bars, cinemas, bookstores, auditoriums, decorations, clothes and so many other things in shopping malls - the mall can embrace everything in a kaleidoscopic way. If the great magazine gives us the spectacle of the merchandise fair, the shopping center offers us the subtle recital of consumption, whose art, all of it, precisely, consists in playing with the ambiguity of the sign of the objects and the sublime status of its utility and merchandise in a game of scenery: generalized neoculture in which there is no more difference between a fine grocery store and a painting gallery, between *Playboy*³ and a treatise on paleontology... There we find ourselves at the center of consumption as the total organization of daily life, total homogenization, where everything is easily apprehended and forgotten in the translucence of an abstract happiness, defined simply by the appeasement of tensions" (*La Société de Consommation*, Galimard, 1970).

It should also be made clear that productive time is not confused with the concept of productive work. In modern capitalist societies, productive labor is that which allows the accumulation of capital

² An analysis of these interrelations between production and consumption can be seen in Marx's *Grundrisse* (1857-1858).

³ World-famous female nude magazine at the time.

through surplus value, through profit, that is, a greater or lesser difference between the exchange value of goods and services and the values paid for the labor which produced them. Therefore, when we use the notion of productive time, we include both productive labor and labor of simple economic exchange, such as services, which adds nothing to the social product that accumulates.

Going back to non-productive, residual or complementary time, it can be seen that its duration varies, historically, due to the nature of productive time and its social relations of production. The residual time is that which is subtracted from the productive time. It is residual precisely because productive time is the main or most important time in societies. It exists as a function of or as a result of productive time, since the latter depends on the productions and the economic values generated by them. In short, productive time is the time that creates or reproduces the material conditions of existence. If we compare the two, we see that the remaining time can often exceed the productive time. Nevertheless, the remaining time is distributed around the productive time, since this is the core of our vital system.

The residual time could be attributed to the characteristic of not providing income to the labor factor, since the income of the wage earners may come from the hours spent in economic production or conservation. This is the case, for example, of hourly workers. However, this difference does not apply to weekend rest and vacation periods when non-productive time continues to be remunerated by law.

By observing the times that have been pointed out, it can be seen that social life is taking place in the midst of different times, although intimately linked and interdependent. They are distinct as to the nature of the action, as to the factors that condition our action and

also as to the satisfactions sought. They are different, above all, in the relationships that individuals maintain between themselves and with the objects of action. This means that, in dependence on action and time, the subject objectifies himself in a different way.

Commonly, the people we live with and the objects we deal with in our working time cause us a certain well-characterised behavioural reaction. In other words, in time and in working action, human beings and objects become, more often than not, means or instruments of coexistence and compulsory procedures, since they constitute elements of an external or transcendent system to the subject himself. To a greater or lesser extent, working time does not satisfy spiritually or does not offer the possibility of personal exteriorization (objectification). Of course, there are exceptions, such as artistic, scientific, intellectual, or even entrepreneurial tasks that make their work not only an economic support, but a life destination. But this does not correspond to the reality of most wage-earners and human generations. This is so because productive time, the time socially necessary for the maintenance of material conditions of existence, is standardized and coercive. It is we who have to adapt to it and to its social purposes. Consequently, the subject's relationships produce limited, imperious and even strange objectives. Or, in philosophical language, alienated or alienating.

And the ways in which the process of work and the dimension of productive time are organized have not presented notable distinctions between capitalist and centralized socialist modes of production. It became commonplace throughout the 20th century to mention the efforts of Lenin and the later leaders of the Soviet Union to spread

and employ Taylor's methods in the process of industrial labor.⁴ This situation led Georges Friedmann, in *Le Travail en Miettes* (The Work in Crumbs, portuguese version, Perspectiva 1972), to write: "State socialism, whatever its contributions to the individual, thanks to the facilities of education and promotion that may benefit him, does not seem to satisfy, in its complexity, his tendencies to participate, discouraging him by the excess of centralization, by bureaucratic hypertrophy, by the bulk of his layer of administrators imbued with technicalism, the multitude of instances and committees whose decisions are, in fact, imposed upon him".

But in the residual or complementary time there are also certain activities of a compulsory nature, indispensable to the very creation of the social product, such as the satisfaction of vital biological needs - psychosomatic recovery and food supply - and also social commitments of a different nature, such as family, civil or religious.

Both times, therefore, as well as the factors that determine their duration and the value of existence, constitute the primordial durations - that of economic production and that of biological and social demands.

Finally, depending on historical, social and political relations, there will be a third time in which the impositions of labour and biological and social needs will have a mitigated effect. It constitutes that period or those moments in which the control of economic production or the biological and social demands will no longer need to be rigidly fulfilled, because they have already been realized. This third time thus represents a new residue of social life. It is the time of leisure and of its freely chosen activities.

⁴ Clearly, one needs only read the *Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government* and check the stimulated consecration given to the standard workers.

The Leisure Time

What initially distinguishes leisure time from others is the flexibility of choice or engagement that the subject has in relation to the activity, that is, in the form of his objectification (the individual's way of exteriorizing, the way the subject projects himself in the outside it). It is as if leisure time allowed us a sense of freedom or enabled us to exercise simpler and more immediate personal aspirations and desires, as well as the deeper ones. The objects that are dealt with and the personal relationships experienced seem to strip away the exclusively instrumental and alien character that primordial times require. The sea is no longer a commercial route. It regains the simple attraction of body contact with water and the sun. It inspires the painting of a navy or the creation of a verse.⁵ These differentiated relationships between the subject and the object have a natural, more spontaneous and direct, or immediate connection. This means that all other socioeconomic controls reduce their strength of constraint or affect them in a remote way: the form of appropriation of the object, the body and mental performance, the administrative and managerial norms that accompany the actions of work and social obligations, all necessarily utilitarian. In this third period, which is leisure, there is a tendency to a qualitative change in human relations and actions.

⁵ In the first great French Encyclopedia, directed by Diderot and D'Alembert, the term is thus defined by Diderot himself: "Vacant time (vuide) that our duties leave us and which we can dispose of in a pleasant and honest way. If our education had been well done, and had inspired us with a lively taste for virtue, the history of our leisure activities would be the portion of our life that would most honor us after death and which we would remember with greater consolation when abandoning life: it would be that of the good deeds to which we would be led by taste and sensitivity, without anything determined to them, except our own beneficence".

The freedom that is established in time and leisure activities must, however, be nuanced. Some authors give as a synonym of leisure the expression "free time", which is partly correct as to time itself. But it must be taken into account that the content of leisure remains subject to a series of social, cultural, economic, ideological and even physical and geographical circumstances. Therefore, leisure will be possible according to consumption capacity and social position, according to the school background and previous life experiences, due to acquired habits and psychic predispositions. Given its doubly subtractive nature - of productive time and the residual time of social obligations - leisure remains an internal category of political economy, being generated and appropriated as a result of the same social relations. This is also why it translates, in its own way, the spheres of production, distribution, exchange and consumption. Its individual and collective forms do not arise and are not experienced except as emanations of the political economy itself. It is for this reason that the classes of a society practice different leisure in relation to its content and intensity, even in countries with smaller income disparities and social imbalances.

Consequently, leisure takes place as a negative moment, i.e. as a period opposite to working time. It is because it still represents a kind of radiation of the primordial times that it manifests itself in a subordinate way to various circumstances. On the level of ideas, it is a category that does not affirm itself as a substrate or essence, since its freedom, although real in certain aspects, derives from productive time and from the residual time devoted to other social obligations.

In contemporary texts on the subject, it can be seen that the discussions retain a certain common atmosphere. In other words, leisure is, most of the time, seen as a compensating phenomenon or

as the opposite of productive activity and exchange. As an antithesis or secretion of work. This is the case of Georges Friedmann: "... every activity subsumed in the concept of work implies a primary element of obligation, of constraint. For the definition of work, this observation becomes increasingly important in a time like ours, in which the individual, at different levels of production, devotes himself, outside his professional tasks, to so many other lateral activities that differ precisely by the absence of this element of economic obligation, of institutional imposition, and are marked by diverse nuances of contingency and choice" (quoted by M.F. Lanfant in *Les Théories du Loisir*, Paris, PUF, 1972, pg. 17).

This same disentanglement between activities and working time, on the one hand, and activities and leisure time, on the other, is basic in Joffre Dumazedier's empirical sociology: "Leisure time is granted to the individual by society when he has performed, according to the social norms of the moment, his professional, family, socio-spiritual and socio-political obligations. It is a time that the reduction of work and socio-political obligations make available; the individual frees himself at his taste from fatigue, resting; from boredom, having fun; from functional specialization, developing in an interested way the capacities of his body or his spirit" (*Sociologia Empírica do Lazer, Empirical Sociology of Leisure*, Perspectiva, 1979, pgs. 91-92).

Almost nothing differs from the concept expressed by Prudenskij in *The Time and the Work* ("Vremja i Trud", Moscow, 1965), translated by the Paris Leisure Study Group: "Free time corresponds to that part of time outside work and is intended for the physical and intellectual development of workers, as well as their rest. What appears to be the most important particularity of this category in socialist society is the equal right of workers to use their free time; a right based on relations

with society, on equality of work and on the wage perceived by work... Man can exist, eat, sleep and work, but if he has neither time nor opportunity to elevate his knowledge and to possess knowledge, there can be no reproduction of the spiritual forces of society".

Thus understood, leisure does not exist as an axis or substantial notion, but accidental. And, indeed, for it one can never claim a status of that nature. As long as the human mode of existence remains subject to contradictory parcels of time, to the conflicts between an objectification foreign to itself and self-assertion, between needs and autonomy, between the individual and society, man will continue to externalize only parcels of his feelings and capacities.

The character of opposition or compensation to work, as time and formal activity, turns leisure into a negation of a primitive presupposition (borrowing a Hegelian term), in this case, work itself. This conception was perceived, in fact, by Charlotte Busch in *Sociologie du Temps Libre* (Paris, Mouton, 1975, p. 7): "Leisure time is not a global phenomenon like society, nor a partial but well defined social phenomenon like the family. It is a residual category of existence, lived according to professional and extraprofessional responsibilities and obligations, and the fundamental needs of life. Free time is a negative concept, it is the time liberated by the injunctions defined by the contracepts".

Now, being a negative action, in the face of the compulsion of other needs, leisure, unlike work, an economic and professional action, cannot affirm itself as human self-determination.

The Evolution of Leisure Time

Every society creates a social product and, within it, an economic surplus value (*Mehrwert*), that is, briefly, a part of goods and services not absorbed by the expenses made in the production itself. In societies where productive forces and productivity are expanding, the social product tends to be growing and, to a greater extent, the surplus value obtained.

Thus, in the 17th century, and until the middle of the 18th century, the working days of urban craftsmen in England did not exceed ten hours a day. The situation began to change after the last Jacobite rebellion (1745),⁶ when the days were gradually extended to twelve, fourteen or even sixteen hours in different branches (Marx - *Salary, Price and Profit*). The author assures us: "What today, for example, in the state of Massachusetts, until recently the freest state in North America, is proclaimed as the legal limit of the work of boys under twelve years of age, was the normal working day in England, still in the mid-seventeenth century, in force for workers in full vigor, for sturdy country braces and for athletic blacksmiths" (*The Capital*, chapter VIII, portuguese version, Ed. Civilização Brasileira). Marx refers here to the General Statutes of Massachusetts and the Act to limit the hours of labor of New Jersey, which in 1838 and 1851, respectively, set the ten-hour day for children under the age of twelve.

The increase in productive time was linked to the increasingly intense concentration of free workers in manufacturing and the disappearance of the corporate labor process, replaced in an intermediate phase by the *domestic system* (home-based work).

⁶ The Jacobites were monophysist Christians, that is, they only accepted the divine nature of Christ. The Stuart family in Scotland were adept at that concept.

If at first the monarchy provided a series of edicts favorable to the masters of the corporations, such as those proclaimed by Louis XI, allying them in the fight against feudalism, in later centuries it began to undermine the regulations of the guilds, submitting them to the direct control of the king. Excessive taxes were applied and a severe inspection of the communities was imposed, measures adopted, for example, by Richelieu. Conflicts between apprentices and journeymen on the one hand and the masters on the other, as well as changes in the relations between the monarchy and the professional orders, led to the spread of home-based work as early as the 16th century, in the middle of the Renaissance. "Free work has spread throughout Europe since the 16th century. The industry creates workshops in rural areas and farmers work there outside any regulation. Such phenomena are reproduced everywhere, more or less late, according to the political evolution of the country. They will drag with them the disappearance of the corporations" (François Barret, *Histoire du Travail*, Paris, Puf, 1955, pg. 33).

In the course of the eighteenth century, when the accumulation of mercantile capital and the waves of rural workers expelled by the movement of enclosures had shaped the most favorable situation, it is that manufactures and, with them, the first great Industrial Revolution. "Industrial capitalism begins when a significant number of workers are employed by a single capitalist ... The capitalist has assumed these management functions by virtue of his ownership of capital. In capitalist exchange relations, the time of salaried workers was their property as much as the raw material supplied and the products coming out of their workshops ... the rules of learning and legal statutes, common to the feudal and corporate mode of production, persisted for some time and had to be gradually banned

as the capitalist consolidated his powers in society and destroyed the legal aspects of pre-capitalist social formations "(Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital*, portuguese version, Zahar, 1981, pgs. 61-62). Quoting David Landes (*The Unbound Prometheus, Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe*, 1969), Braverman continues: "The manufacturer who wanted to increase production had to obtain more work from the workforce already recruited. Here, however, he fell back into the system's internal contradictions. And he had no way of compelling his workers to a certain number of hours: the weaver, or home craftsman, was master of his time, starting and stopping whenever he wanted".

If by 1819 there were already ten thousand workers in cotton weaving manufactures (whose machinery developed much more slowly than that of spinning machines), and still about 240 thousand exercising the subcontract work, in the domestic system, already in the years from 1840 the structure had been radically transformed, with 150 thousand workers in manufacturing and only 60 thousand in the intermediate production process (cf. Frédéric Mauro, *World Economic History*, portuguese version, Zahar, 1976, ch. 1).

The situation of ownership, or at least co-ownership of working time, served as a topic for harsh debates at the end of the 18th century between opponents and supporters of a modification of the current system. In Chapter VIII of *The Capital*, which deals with the working day, Marx reproduces some extracts from this struggle. First of all, read Postlethwayt (*First Preliminary Discourse*): "I cannot end these brief observations without registering the trivial comment, made by many people, that the worker does not work every six days, one can earn enough to live in five days. They conclude by the need to raise taxes, or any other measure, on the means of subsistence in

order to force the craftsman and the manufacturing worker to work uninterruptedly six days a week. I must ask permission to disagree with these great politicians who are fighting for the perpetual enslavement of the workers of this kingdom; they forget the proverb: work, without diversion, is brutal. Do not the English boast of the ingenuity and skill of their craftsmen and their workers in manufacture, qualities which to this day have given credit and renown to British goods? What is the cause of this? Probably only one: the peculiar way in which the working population knows how to recreate itself. If they were forced to work [men, women and children] all year round, repeating the same task incessantly, would they not have their originality damaged, would they not become stupid, instead of alert and skillful, would they not lose our workers, in this eternal slavery, their renown, instead of preserving it? What artistic skill could be expected from exhausted animals?... Many of them perform in four days of work what the French do in five, sometimes six... I hope they never lose those privileges or the good life from which their ingenuity and courage are derived".

In response, the anonymous author of *Essay on Trade and Commerce* (1770) argues: "If rest on the seventh day of the week is a divine institution, we must conclude that the other days of the week belong to work, and compel others to fulfill that precept cannot be considered cruelty. That humanity, by nature, tends towards convenience and laziness, we know to be true by the fatal experience we have with the plebs employed in manufacturing who, on average, work no more than four days a week, unless the means of subsistence become more expensive... The cure will be perfect when manufacturing workers are content to work six days for the same amount they receive in four days".

It is also very illustrative the passage of one of the letters that Machiavelli sent to his friend Francesco Vettori (10 December 1513) when he was in Albergaccio, already expelled from Florence by the Medici family: "Then comes lunchtime and, with my own, as this poor village and my scarce patrimony allow. Having had lunch, I returned to the inn: there is the innkeeper and, ordinarily, a butcher, a miller, two ovenmen. With them I am entertained all afternoon playing the *cricca*, the *triquetraque*, and after that a thousand discussions and endless exchanges of insulting words are born; most of the time we play seriously and they hear us shouting at no less distance than San Casciano".⁷

The period from 1750 to 1850 in England, and up to the last years of the 19th century for the other countries of Europe (as well as for various segments of English industry), presents a picture of the exploitation of living labour even more serious than that seen in the 14th and 15th centuries, both in relation to the form of appropriation of value, and with regard to the working time required.

"Thus, in summer, the day in the Parisian handicraft reaches a maximum of 16 to 17 hours; in winter, it does not exceed 11 hours. But these figures correspond to the number of hours between the beginning and the end of the work; from them it is necessary to subtract the breaks and the time for meals in order to obtain the actual duration of the work. The status of the woolen cloth straighteners, in 1384, granted them from two and a half to three and a half hours of break, depending on the season" (Jean Verdon, *Les Loisirs au Moyen*

⁷ *Vieni in questo mentre l'ora del desinare, dove con la mia brigata mi mangio di quelli cibi che questa povera villa e paululo patromonio comporta. Mangiato che ho, ritorno nell'hosteria: quivi è l'hoste, per l'ordinario, um beccaio, um mugnaio, due fornaciai. Com questi io m'ingaglioio per tutto di giuocando a cricca, a trich-trach, e poi dove nascono mille contese e infiniti dispetti di parole injuriose; e il più dele volte si combate um quattrino e siamo sentiti non di manco gridare da San Casciano.*

Âge, Tallandier, 1980, p. 11). There would thus be a variation between 8 and a half hours and 13 and a half hours a day between summer and winter.

The number of annual working days varied from 250 to 260, of which at least 70 with reduced days, given the climatic conditions. Consequently, the number of days released was 105 or 115, depending on the status of the corporation. The provisions of the artisanal orders included provisions prohibiting work on Saturdays and Sundays and on certain dates, covering days sainted, the day before or the day after.

It should also be noted that the technology of manufacture artificialized the physical working environments, thus obtaining a regularity of productive time, previously intermittent and variable according to the circumstances of the natural climate.

The need to modify production relations and the labor process, submitting both to the direct control of capital, together with the appropriation of the absolute surplus value, translated into the transfer, to the interior of the industry, of the control of the labor hours and, consequently, in the reduction of the residual time previously existing.

And yet, while on the one hand changes in social relations and the labour process led to an increase in average working time, decreasing residual time, on the other hand the volume of production and productivity gains grew enormously. English exports, expressed in millions of pounds, jumped from 9 in 1741 to 36 in 1801. Excluding wool, manufactured goods increased their share of exports from 8 to 27% in the same period. "This shift reflected the growing production of nails, axes, firearms, railroad cars, watches, scarves, buttons, ropes, and thousands of other goods; the variety became so great

that customs officials grew weary of filling long commodity relationships and launched large portions of these exports under the title 'various kinds of goods' (André G. Frank, *World Cumulation*, 1492-1789, portuguese version, Zahar, p. 242, quoting Ralph Davis in *English Foreign Trade*, London, 1969).

Carboniferous extraction, which did not reach 6.5 million tons in 1780, reached 64 million tons in 1850. An increase of more than 880% in marginal productivity. The consumption of cotton, about 5.1 million pounds in the years 1771-1780, exceeded each of the 98 million pounds in the decade 1811-1820, showing a jump of approximately 1820%.

It is undeniable that during the expansion of the social product and productivity at the time of manufacture and until the phase of concentration of capital and technology, at the end of the 19th century, there was a substantial expansion of productive time. Its subsequent reduction, slowly achieved, could not come automatically, spontaneously, in the manner of a *deus ex machina*. It was a simultaneous consequence of two factors, both linked to the new social relations of production: on the one hand, the intensification of work, allowed by machinery; on the other, the process of politicizing labor relations. "The unmeasured lenght of the working day, produced by the machinery in the hands of capital, after a certain time provokes... a reaction of society that, threatened in its vital roots, establishes a normal working day, legally limited. As a consequence of this limitation, a phenomenon we have already examined - the intensification of work - assumes decisive importance... In general terms, the method of producing relative surplus value consists of enabling the worker, with the increase in labor productivity, to produce more with the same expenditure of labor, at the same time... But

things are different after the working day is reduced coercively. This reduction, with the powerful impulse it gives to the development of the productive force and to the saving of production conditions, imposes on the worker a greater expenditure of work at the same time, a higher tension of the work force, a denser filling of the pores of the journey, in in short, such a degree of condensation of work that can only be achieved by reducing the working day ... Working time is now measured in two ways, according to its length (duration) and according to its degree of condensation (intensity) ... The first effect of the shortened working hours stems from this evident law: the workforce's ability to operate is the inverse ratio of the time it operates. Therefore, and within certain limits, what is lost in duration, gains in effectiveness. Through the method of remuneration (wages per piece, per task and other stimuli), capital induces workers to actually employ a larger workforce ... the introduction of the manufacturing law has shown in a striking way that the simple reduction of the working day increases considerably regularity, uniformity, order, continuity and energy of work "(Karl Marx, *The Capital*, portuguese version, Civilização Brasileira, book I, chapter XIII, pp. 466-468).

Besides the phenomenon of intensification and compression of work - greater effort in less time - generators of relative surplus value, the socio-political struggles and forces - union, associative, partisan - developed in parallel with that of the production process it had generated by concentrating live work and, at the same time, expropriating it.

Political and economic conflicts between capital and labor began to take on the connotation of a real struggle between the two new social classes as early as 1830. The date "... determines an even more

radical innovation in politics: the appearance of working class as a self-conscious and independent political force in Great Britain and France, and of nationalist movements in a large number of European countries ... And in Great Britain and Western Europe, this year marks the beginning of those decades of crisis in the development of the new society, which conclude with the defeat of the revolutions of 1848 and the huge economic leap after 1851 "(Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolutions* - 1789/1848, portuguese version, Paz e Terra, 1981).

The need to reduce the plundering of work and the time spent on it (labor laws) was part of the broader political transformation movements of capitalist society for better wages, universal suffrage and popular education. Only painful experiences resulting from unrest, strikes, prisons, exiles and massacres could soften the insatiable voracity of capital. Let us remember en passant: the Working Men's Association (1836), the People's Charter (1838-1848), the Christian socialism of Buchez and Leroux, the utopian communism of Cabet, the xenophobic revolutionism of Blanqui, Marxism, the anarchism of Bakunin and Kropotkin's, Proudhonism, the revolutions of 1830, 1848, the Paris Commune, the unionism of Labriola and Sorel, the idea of general strikes (Tortellier, Dormoy). And yet the struggles of international meetings and associations for limiting work to eight hours; the French Labor Party, the Fabian Society, the Trade Union Congress, the German Social Democratic Party and the AFL and Industrial Workers of the World, in the United States.

The manufacturing laws of 1847-1848, 1850 and 1853 in England are usually pointed out as the first to circumscribe the working day to ten hours a day. In fact, the acts fixed an average weekly production time, often increased by one hour a day, as the reports of factory

inspectors during the decades of 1850 and 1860 attested in practice. The laws stipulated ten and a half hours for the first five days and seven and a half hours for the Saturday, or sixth day. In addition, several branches of industry did not benefit from those laws: ceramics, silk weaving, matches, bakery, and private services: coachmen, bus drivers, and laundry workers, for example.

In any case, only from 1937, in England, with the laws of nine hours, did adult and male working time return to the same duration as in the 17th century and first half of the 18th century (with the exception of the miners, who had achieved the eight-hour journey for the first five days in 1908). In France, a similar situation occurred after the First World War, in 1919, with the eight-hour law.

We thus have the following table of Weekly Working Hours Evolution, according to the *International Labour Office's Year Book of Labour Statistics* (1980).

<i>England</i>	<i>France</i>
1650-1750 – 45 a 55 hs	1650-1750 – 50 a 60 hs
1750-1850 – 72 a 80 hs	1750-1848 – 72 a 80 hs
1850-1937 – 58 a 60 hs	1848-1919 – 60 a 68 hs
1937 – 45 a 51 hs	1919 – 46 a 50 hs
1971 – 44 hs	1979 – 41,2 hs

When the union and party struggle intensified at the end of the 19th century, within the centric countries of industrialization; when the accumulation of liquid industrial capital had already reached higher levels than the previous ones and the international division of labor had gained momentum, via imperialism, then absolute overwork could be gradually absorbed by mechanical steam and then

electromechanical equipment. This begins the process of reducing the socially necessary time for production in countries with advanced capitalism.

To recall, in England there were 719 strikes in 1899; 346 in 1904; 585 in 1907, and over 800 in 1910. In 1912 and 1913, some 2.5 million commercial workers and workers paralyzed their activities in Ireland. From 1893 to 1898, 7,029 strikes broke out in the United States, a number that rose to 15,463 in the years between 1899 and 1904. In France, the CGT, created in 1895 and reorganized in 1902, commanded almost all the strikes by reducing working hours, mainly the general ones of 1906, 1920 and 1936.

If during the manufacturing era the workload had risen progressively to 72 to 80 hours per week, depending on the country and the branch of production, it began to decline at the end of the 19th century, *pari passu* with the formation of large companies. The increase in residual time coincided with the advancement of more comprehensive social goals and the replacement of small and medium-sized manufacturing properties, of extensive labor, by industries of centralization of capital and technology.

Free time scholars have said and repeated that this emerged and developed with the Industrial Revolution. But the obvious fact is that residual time takes its first big leap, after the first great Industrial Revolution, in an advanced era of qualitative transformations of capitalism, mainly from the socio-political point of view. It was necessary to combine the workers' struggles, always late in relation to the very genesis of the industrial proletariat, the advent of the great enterprise and the modification of the nature of surplus value so that production time would regress. Therefore, the residual times (psychosomatic recovery and sociofamily obligations) and leisure

times (free choice activities) are economic and political products, whose frontiers lie in the capacity for growth of social product, productivity and, consequently, of the population's standard of living.

Comparing, for example, the wage cost index, the productivity index, the GNP index and the average weekly working hours of the United States, France and Germany (still the Federal Republic) between 1960 and 1972, it can be seen that the macroeconomic gains have been converted mainly into wage form and very little into residual time (International Economic Report of the President, Washington DC, Printing Office, 1977).

I) Salary costs in dollars and variations (1967 = 100)

	1960	1972	% variação
EUA	77,0	137,0	78
France	56,1	164,3	193
Germany	51,9	211,7	308

II) Productivity and variations (same years)

EUA	78,8	116,0	47
France	68,7	135,9	98
Germany	66,4	130,3	96

III) GNP in dollars and variations

EUA	73,1	116,2	59
France	66,7	134,1	101
Germany	76,2	130,8	72

IV) Weekly working hours

EUA	40,0	40,5	+ 1
France	46,0	44,6	- 3
Germany	44,8	42,8	- 4,5.

During the aforementioned period, the automation and computing systems made notable progress, causing more technological unemployment than reducing the length of live work. More emphasis was placed on income from work than on subtractive or leisure time; the aim was to ensure an improvement in the standard of living rather than a corresponding decrease in productive time.

Similar data could be observed for Japan. Between 1968 and 1976, economic indices showed the following increases for productivity, GNP and wage cost: 82%, 69% and 355%, respectively. For the same period, average hours of work decreased from 44.6 to 40.2, rising again to 41.2 in 1980 (Year Book of Labor Statistics, 1980).

Therefore, asserting that production and productivity are causes of residual time does not explain much of this dynamic. Between 1900 and 1912, the average hours of industrial work dropped in the United States from 55.3 to 50, or about four times more than the phase between 1960 and 1972, of greater production and greater productivity. In addition, in that first period, the GNP went through an annual increase of 3.72%, a percentage lower than the most recent mentioned, of 4.92%.

We believe that the conclusion is, once again, unequivocal. Residual time embodies one of the possible socio-political achievements. Otherwise, a purely mechanical process (production - productivity) would have already led the residual time to a maximum

of 25 hours per week, maintaining the pace of the first half of the 20th century.

This dynamic is similar, in our view, to that of the remuneration of the labor factor. There are purely economic situations that influence it, but the greater or lesser capacity for resistance or social struggle can also interfere in the results of the process.

Myth and Reason

Until the 6th century BC, in Greece, the words myth and logos (μῦθος, λόγος) denote similar actions. That is, both meant speech, narration or, according to modern semiology, discourse. There was, therefore, no clear separation of meanings, and they could be used indifferently. This is the case of homeric texts, for example.

The myth brought with it forms and content closely linked to archaic thought. It almost always referred to the creation of the world and the sensitive reality, as well as establishing precepts of religious, ethical or moral conduct. Through it, the king (*anax or basileus*) delivered sentences of sacred justice (*thémistes*), against which there was no appeal. Fruit of oral civilizations, the myth was also a mnemotechnical way to relive the past, to reaffirm the sacredness of life and supernatural beings - the demiurges of the world and of men. The mythical songs, always recited and never written, were narrations of celestial origin and translated the divine word itself. For this reason, poetry (*poiesis*) was the most finished form, the vehicle *par excellence* of mythic language (prose has always been, historically, after poetic form, both in European and Asian civilizations). It was chaired by the goddess *Mnemosyne* (the memory). Poetry enchanted and moved precisely because of its predicates and its sacred origin.

Another characteristic intrinsic to the myth was that which configured ambivalence, the renunciation of the marked differences between things and between the essences of things (*ousía*). Thus, the bisexuality of the gods, the actions considered good and, at the same time, harmful, the destructible and creative behavior, the ambiguity of truth and lies, phenomena that made myth a universe of totalizing cognitive expression, that is, one that unifies all phenomena beyond their diversity.

This same non-contradictory dimension prevented a clear demarcation between the notions of work and leisure, merged that were in the concept of vital need.

The myth, however, could only survive by uniting the sacred and the monarchic. With the progressive advent of other political forms, the mythical word and discourse no longer represent the divine and sovereign order of *basileus*. The word is humanized, individualized and, at the same time, socialized in the *polis*. It acquires a status or condition of political action, of citizenship. This transformation begins in the warrior strongholds, where the first assemblies, the *mesoi*, so-called the common circle of infantry soldiers, who begin to discuss the structure and organization of the army. Later, in the 6th century BC, such assemblies would extend to other social segments that struggled against the predominance of royalty. The word *mesoi* will also mean "middle class", as well as "what is available to everyone" or "public".

The meaning of the word myth will remain as allegory (*allos agorein*), the discourse that serves to narrate the other, the one or that which is no longer present. And reason (the *logos*), the discourse that builds the *politeia* or the democratic government, which describes the reason for things, will, little by little, impose itself definitively. The

popular demand for the publication of laws, the clamor for legislative codifications and philosophical discussions will play the role of propagating this new knowledge that discriminates facts, that doubts the myth, that establishes distinctions, that, finally, claims the power, previously unified, of the sacred and the monarchy.

For what interests us more closely, we will see that Greek thought, while introducing a separation between myth and reason, discriminates or names the different meanings of the word work, relating it to the purpose of action. Consequently, there will be a painful action-work, with the modern sense, a technical activity of creation, also present in current concepts, and a simultaneous activity - work / leisure - that our thought has difficulties to apprehend, but which is inscribed in utopias future societies, individualized and freely chosen labor societies, by virtue of global automation and the reinstitution of society.

Worjs and Days

The primary investigation on the categories of work in Western culture is evidently found in Hesiod's work "The Works and the Days" (*Erga kai Hemera*).

After the traditional invocation to the muses and the request to the supreme god to accept his argument, the poet discusses the two disputes or emulations (eris) that men face. One of them must be condemned because it gives rise to disagreements and wars. The other should be praised because it "awakens to effective action (ergon) even the man with the indolent arm"; "The potter envies the potter's struggle; the singer, that of the singer. This emulation is good

for mortals” (songs 15 to 25). And the two precepts that must guide men in these emulations are justice and effective action.

Then, Hesiod sings the myth of Prometheus, and with it the transformation of creative action into work (*from ergon to ponos*). The fourth song describes the myth of the five human genera (*genus*). The first one was that of the golden men. They were created by Cronos and lived "like the gods, their hearts free from care, separated and sheltered from pain and misery ... they had fun at feasts, away from all evils". Further on: "the fertile sun produced an abundant and generous harvest by itself, and they, in the joy of peace, lived from their fields amid innumerable goods" (verses 110 to 121). By order of Zeus, they became the guardians (*phylakés*) of mortals, "when the sun went down at sunset".

The second genus, that of the silver men, had perks similar to his predecessor, although the creatures did not live as long as the first; but they were soon punished by Zeus for refusing to worship the gods, being then transformed into geniuses of Hades.

The genre of bronze men, created to serve Ares, the god of war, followed. The fourth race was made up of the direct ancestors of contemporary Hesiod men. They had a semidivine origin (*emiteoi*) and formed the warrior lineage of Thebes and Troy. They live, after death, in the ends of the Earth, equally free from concerns about their daily existence. They are fortunate heroes, for whom the sun brings the harvest three times a year, without having to work for it.

The fifth gender, that of iron age men, is destined for daily suffering, tiredness in obtaining their goods, in the daily struggle that characterizes the *ponos*. The resemblance to YHWH's condemnation in Eden is symptomatic of the human condition. For Hesiod, this fifth genre will disappear due to its own malice, deregulation (*hybris*) and

lack of awareness of its own individuality, feelings of dignity (*aidós*) and public awareness and human respect. Human extinction, or at least that of the Iron Age race, will be the consequence of divine wrath (from *Nemesis*, the goddess of justice and fortune).

In the next song, Hesiod addresses the kings, affirming that only where justice and temperance prevail life can become joyful and productive. Because justice is the first among goods, the land of this kingdom offers a full life; domestic animals supply the house with abundance; fruit is multiplied on the plantations and the feasts can be joyful, continuous and carefree.

The Prometheus Myth

It is through the Prometheus myth that Hesiod interprets the appearance of the work.

During a banquet, at a time when men, gods and titans were still living together, Prometheus, one of the titans, finds himself in charge of sharing the portions of meat among the guests. The titanic hero then distributes plentiful and abundant parts to men, and Zeus offers a portion wrapped in fat, but filled with bones. The meaning of his attitude is to face the power and the way of partition of goods between men and gods. Revolted by the injury, Zeus hides the sacred and natural fire, together with the earth's natural fertility (*bios*). However, Prometheus manages to recreate the fire in the stem of a narthex and transmit this knowledge to men.

The consequence of these acts coincides with the end of the golden age, "whose mythical representation underlines the opposition between fertility and work, since at that time all wealth came from the land spontaneously ... In this context, fertility and work appear as two

opposite and complementary functions. The human condition is characterized precisely by this double and ambivalent aspect. Every advantage has its counterpart, every good, its evil” (Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Myth and Thought among the Greeks*, portuguese version, Ed. Difusão Europeia, 1973, pp. 209-210). The duplicity of the nature of the work - suffering and coercion, on the one hand, and wealth, on the other - also corresponds to the two struggles or emulations sung by Hesiod at the beginning of his poem.

Human action, that is, *ergon*, which transforms a power into an act, a virtuality into something concrete, and which until then included work, acquires a new meaning, but at the same time terrible, in the sense of strange and disastrous. For work arises that requires effort, which becomes foreign to the individual who performs it, and thus embitters their existence and human condition. In modern language, terrible is nothing more than the concept of alienation.

Work in Greek Rational Thought

In slave society, Greek thought came to distinguish, under different names, actions that today we group under the meaning of work. This distinction, however, became accentuated after the mythical period.

First, we can find the word already mentioned *ergon* (from the verb *ergazestai*), which expresses the product of a virtue immanent to each being, that which is veiled or covered up, but present in potential. Like, for example, the possibility of the seed becoming a tree, or the newborn becoming an adult.

This virtuality includes, in turn, *prattein* (from *praxis*) and *poiein* (from *poieisis*), or labor. *Prattein* is a natural activity whose purpose is not to produce an external, socially useful objective, but which

sticks to the success of those who exercise or practice it. This idea is developed in passages VII, 1325 of Politics, and Z4, 1140 of Nicomachean Ethics, both by Aristotle, as well as in Plato's *Cármides*, 163b. For example: "The variable class includes both produced and practiced things. There is a difference between producing and acting ... so that the reasoned ability to act differs from the reasoned ability to produce. That is why they are not included in one another, because neither acting is producing, nor producing is acting" (Nicomachean Ethics). Later on, exposing the nature of happiness, the philosopher will say: "... we must first classify happiness as an activity, as we said above, and if some activities are necessary and desirable with a view to other things, while others are in themselves, it is evident that happiness should be included among those desirable in themselves and not among those that are for the sake of something else ... Now, those activities in which nothing else is sought but the activity itself are desirable in themselves" (Idem, *ibidem*). It can be seen that here the notion of freedom or non-constraint is introduced, as well as the immanence of acting.

As for labor (*poiein*), it constitutes the technical work of the artisan, of the farmer, with the purpose of manufacturing an external object, destined to satisfy a need of a social order. It is enlightening in this respect to the forms of life that Aristotle cataloged as independent of needs and freely chosen. They have in common the purpose of contemplating or even "practicing" the beautiful: life with the objective of taking care of the body; the one dedicated to the subjects of the *polis* and the theoretical or contemplative, philosophical or scientific life, which investigates the being (*ti estin to on*). These lives (*bioi*) are based on action, on praxis, and never on labor (*poiein*), since this

arises from a compulsion that excludes freedom (check also in Nicomachean Ethics, 1.5 and in Eudemo Ethics, 1215 to 35).

Aristotle says about it: “Judging by the life that men lead in general, most of them, and men of a more ordinary type, seem, not without a certain foundation, to identify good or happiness with pleasure, and for that reason they love the life of joy. It can be said, in fact, that there are three types of life: that which we have just mentioned, political and contemplative life. As for the life devoted to gain, it is a forced life, and wealth is, of course, not the good we seek: it is something useful, nothing more, and aimed at the interest of something else” (NE, 1095^a, 1096b).

Prattein, consequently, is more connected to the activity of the aedos, the rhapsodians, the musicians, the playwrights, the philosophical discussion and the political debate, builder and administrator of the social rules of common life. In short, to the activities today called artistic, intellectual, cultural and political.

In fact, the links between leisure and politics, in democratic Greece (not only in Athens, but in Miletus, Samos and Megara, among others), were fundamental to the constitution of the polis. A bond that signaled a way of life concerned with citizenship, that is, with legislative and judicial activities. A way of expressing the quality or virtue (*arete*) of civilized man, one who opposes the barbarian because he makes use of discursive reason, persuasion (*peitô*) in the assembly and the *agora*. Hence the writing of Paul Veyne (*Did the Greeks Know Democracy?*, Diógenes Magazine, nº 6, Ed. Univ. De Brasília, 1984): “... Antiquity thought of politics in terms of militancy as naturally as we think of it in terms of democracy, and could not conceive of it any other way ... This is what we will see, considering the relationship between political activism and the social powers of

the time, that is, between civism and leisure ... A city is an institution that it rises among men, and the title in this institution is usually reserved for privileged people who can live on leisure, evidently because they are rich; sometimes the circle of the privileged had extended to the whole people (so in Athens), but in this case it was a great privilege or an abusive laxity. As for Plato, he returns to sound doctrines: all participants in a model city should have a heritage that will allow them to devote themselves exclusively to collective life, for which they will be at leisure ... Young Aristotle, who also drew up a plan from the city, was no less strict: 'Citizens must live a life that is neither artisanal nor mercantile; neither should future citizens be farmers, as there is a need for leisure both to improve quality and to develop political activities' (Politics, 1328b, 35)".

It was easy to see that one would not measure leisure with the stopwatch in hand, but it designated a permanent kind of life. In this sense, the man of leisure, a militant citizen par excellence, has no profession; he identifies himself with the possession of a heritage.

Only at the end of antiquity, or more precisely after the end of the Greek democratic period, did the term *skhole* incorporate the idea of ceasing all activity, including politics, generating the meaning of leisure. Previously, it was the apanage of the free man dedicated to study (hence "school") and public or city affairs. *Skhole* began to indicate quietness, *apolitia* (political inaction) and thus no longer had any correspondence with freedom and the beauty of the classical era. It no longer reflected the intrinsic search for human satisfaction, its transcendence in producing beautiful deeds (*kalós-kai-agazía*, the gathering together of good and beautiful) and in communicating with other men who were equally free (the purpose of the *zoon logon ekhon*, the animal endowed with speech).

It was from this moment that leisure detached itself from its previous active aspect, from its unifying characteristic of intimacy (subjectivity) and of the collective (objectivity) in order to dress in tranquility, unwillingness or "neg-action".

Add to this the term *ponos*, applied to all tasks that require a painful or tiring effort in their achievement. Thus, for example, Xenophon (*Oeconomicus*, tomos V.4 and VI.7) states that *ponos* is a characteristic of agricultural work and warlike exercise.

Still in this respect, one should pay attention to the fact that "... the *ponos* cannot take on the value of active virtue: on the contrary, it appears as submission to an order alien to human nature, as pure subjection and submission. Moreover, "the social history of work confirms that this system of thought clearly translates the form of organization of the polis. The position of slaves in craft activities is increasing: to participate in political life, citizens will pass each time to them and to the metecs the care to ensure the production of wealth" (J.P. Vernant, opus cit. pgs. 235-236).

In the myth of the earthly paradise (Eden), the golden age or even the medieval and Renaissance utopias, human actions which we call work and leisure are not configured as opposite phenomena. They are part of the same sphere of activity and thus interpenetrate. The rupture of this totality occurs, within the mythic-religious vision, as a result of two opposing and complementary factors: the transformation of the human conditions of existence and the progressive knowledge of nature. In other words, the process of detachment that takes place between the self-converted man as a cognizant subject and nature made object of knowledge. In other words, to the extent that archaic man transmutes his way of life and evolves in the process of producing his means of subsistence, he sees nature as something to

be conquered and submitted to his purposes. This overcoming, representative of the subject's self-training, separates him from the unitary conception of the world, for his relation is now that of author and demiurge, and no longer that of a mere creature and actor of this same universe. This hominization (process of historical constitution of the human being), however, does not do without demands. And one of these facets is precisely the hardship of work (the divine punishment of the fall), necessary for the development of the knowledge for which he chose (the adamic choice for the tree of knowledge).

Perhaps for reasons like this, the reconquest of perfection or non-contradiction always returns in authorial utopias, like those of Morus, Swift or Marx. "Communism, as a positive overcoming of private property, as man's self-alienation, and therefore as an effective appropriation of human essence...; therefore, as man's return to himself as a social man, that is, human; a return that is finished, conscious and that has come to be within all the wealth of development up to the present. This communism is, as naturalism = humanism, as humanism = naturalism; it is the true solution of the antagonism between men and nature, between man and man, the definitive resolution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-assertion, between freedom and need (Notwendigkeit), between individual and gender. It is the solved enigma of history and is known as this solution" (K. Marx, *Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts*, portuguese version, Coleção Os Pensadores, Abril Cultural, pg. 8).

The Utopia of a Unit or the Concomitant Denial of Work and Leisure

Returning to the idea that what we call leisure does not constitute, in its essence, a part of time or existence or something opposed to work, but a form of life that by its autonomous actions, being productive or not, useful or not, would integrate man in his (never lived) fullness, let us see how this contradiction could be solved, theoretically, in Hegel and Marx.

In Hegel's study of the "vital process" (*der Lebensprozess*), the subject opposes the objective world, or primitive presupposition, as a subject existing only in and for himself. Consequently, the subject is the end in itself (his own concept) and exteriority represents for him a means and a subjective reality. The subject-world relationship begins by means of an original form of negation of the subject and, simultaneously, by a will to act. To deny oneself and act on the world constitutes a necessity and a first dialectic moment. The world, this other being, is then repositioned as a world for itself, that is, as something identical to the subject himself. By such identity the subject can objectify himself, that is, externalize himself. But such a correspondence between the subject and the outside world cannot be adapted to the totality of the subject, but must correspond to at least one of the particular sides, and this possibility lies in the behaviour of man as "particular". This movement of self-determination of the subject in the face of a world equal to himself becomes, in Hegelian logic, an absolute contradiction, which leads man to the unhappy and painful consciousness of his natural relations.

It is important to retain that the individual's primordial opposition to the world, seen as a need seeking satisfaction, constitutes a human condition, an inevitable passage of consciousness and a

manifestation of the idea as a movement towards his own objectivity. As a natural human condition, the subdivision of the world leads man to work and alienation, to lord-serf dialectics, to the production and reproduction of life.

To overcome this painful moment, it is necessary to experience the conflicts of work, discipline and domination within civil society. This, the *bürgerlich Gesellschaft*, covers the system of needs and their satisfaction by work and exchange. However, the overcoming foreseen by Hegel does not reveal utopias and any revolutionary social or productive organization, which is the distinctive feature of Marxist projection. At least this is what can be concluded from the following passage (*Philosophy of the Spirit*, I, 173, French translation Vera): "Man could not find his true support and his real satisfaction except in this world which is permanently set before him and is taking firm steps without deviating from its course; he must, consequently, manifest the necessary and required capacity for the task to be accomplished".

It is in work itself, and in civil society, that man can find his satisfaction, because even relating to the immediate, to particular and changeable objects, in these there are the universal elements that lead him back to his primitive eagerness, whose content, we will see ahead, is free will. "And the more man exercises his activity in the sphere of his works, the more this general element is detached from the particular elements. Thus man ends up finding his complete satisfaction in his profession and identifying his life with it" (idem, I, 189).

But beyond civil society, it is in law and in the State - the ultimate step of the objective spirit - that the expression of personal particularity, of subjectivity erupts and really becomes effective. The

word "really" does not express a simple adjective, but refers us to the "real while rational" and conscious. For the modern State would be the only one in history that would allow a "space of life" to what is individual in man (which previous slavery and servitude prevented) and, moreover, unveils the free will so that it becomes existence. The leap, therefore, to real and rational satisfaction will be through freedom.

First, freedom is a pure concept (Begriff), or the substance of free will, just as mass, says Hegel, is the substance of matter. If law is part of the domain of the spirit, it has its place and its starting point in the will. "Now, the will is free from the moment that freedom constitutes its substance and its destination. It follows that the system of law is the realm of freedom actually realized, the world of the spirit, a world that the spirit produces from itself, as second nature" (*Principles of Philosophy of Law*, § 4, Derathé translation).

The linking of freedom with will is necessary, for the will without freedom corresponds to a void, to an absence of the subject, to a non-being (Unwesen). And, dialectically, there are three moments in the analytics of freedom: 1) the moment of indetermination, of complete abstraction of content or the freedom of understanding. It corresponds to the "I" itself, to thought in an explosive form, covering a ray of opening without horizon; 2) the instant in which the will is determined and denies the abstraction. Here the will is faced with a particular object and a specific content and, through them, decides. The "I" penetrates into existence, exits from infinity to the finite; 3) finally, the third moment - that of the will in its truth - which means a particularity that self-determines itself, that leads back to universality because it reflects itself: "The third moment consists in the possibility for the self to find itself together within its limitation, in the fact of remaining close

to itself, without ceasing to be bound to the universal, and thus to determine itself... Freedom consists in wanting something determined (therefore, conscious and objective), without ceasing to be close to oneself in this determinity (an effective action of determination) and, to the same, to return to the universal" (idem, § 7 and observations).

Freedom itself (power or possibility) and for itself (effectively realized in the production of itself) only develops and becomes real (idea) through law. Freedom in itself and for itself brings together duty and personal prerogative (or right), because the final moment of the particularity which self-determines and self-reflects is essential and its satisfaction absolutely necessary (cf. paragraph 261). The law is built in the State, and the State is characterized by the interpenetration of the substantial and the accidental, the universal and the particular; this implies that the obligation with regard to the substantial reality is also the manifestation of the particular freedom. It is as a determined and rational citizen, that is, as a citizen who is formed in civil society, aware of this formation, and transcends itself at the level of the State, combining the individual with the collective, the particular with the public, that the effective union of freedom and need occurs.

In his text on *Hegel and the State*, on page 59 (portuguese version), Eric Weil says: "If we had as our objective an analysis of Hegelian thought in its deep unity, this would be the moment to speak of the fundamental concept of satisfaction. It is it that constitutes the ultimate engine of human history: it consigns to this history its term, which will be achieved when each individual is recognized as an absolute value by any other individual and by all individuals; when, in order to remember another idea, mediation is total among men (and between men and nature). Here we are content with this simple

allusion; it will be enough to make us understand in what sense the modern State offers satisfaction to its citizens; each individual knows himself recognised, each individual is and perceives himself as an effective member of the community, and knows even more that he is known and recognised as such by all others and by the State itself".

Since Hegel's primary objective is to describe and explain the continuous movement of the spirit towards objectivity, towards self-awareness, through steps or mediated instances in human history, it is perfectly coherent that he should reconcile freedom for himself and the satisfaction of personal aspirations within the State, since this is the ultimate term of ethical life.

Thus, the elements that would give substance to what we still call leisure would come together for man in his self-awareness, whether in relation to his work and family life, or in relation to rights and duties as a citizen. The happiness (*das Wohl*) of the individual, real because it coexists with the institutions of the State and public life, is the supreme good (*das Gute*) and cannot be separated from the law (cf. paragraph 130). Once again, leisure would not be defined as an activity or moment opposite or complementary to work, nor could it be outside the social totality.

But criticism of the Hegelian categories of freedom, will, satisfaction and happiness, fused in the modern state and in the self-consciousness of the subject and the Spirit, begins early in Marx. Thus, in the *Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts* it is possible to verify that "in Hegel's philosophy of law, private law surpassed = morality; morality surpassed = family; family surpassed = civil society; civil society surpassed = State; the State surpassed = universal history. In reality, private law, morality, family, civil society and the State continue to exist, but they have been converted into moments,

existences and modes of existence of man, which need to be validated in isolation, which dissolve and engender each other, etc., moments of the movement" (opus cit., portuguese version, *Coleção Os Pensadores*, Abril Cultural, pg. 43). All overcoming occurs only as objects of knowledge, as consciousness, and not as practical effectiveness: "... this process (that is, the dialectics of continuous overcoming) must have a carrier, a subject; but the subject only appears as a result; this result, the subject who recognizes himself as absolute self-consciousness, is therefore God, the Absolute Spirit, the idea which is recognized and acts. The effective man and the effective nature become simply predicates, symbols of this non-effective man, hidden, and of this non-effective nature" (idem, p. 45).

In *The German Ideology* (portuguese version, Ed. Presença, Lisbon) Marx will say: "It is certain that we will not bother to explain to our wise philosophers that, by dissolving philosophy, theology, substance, etc. in the Consciousness of itself, thus freeing man from the dictatorship that never subjugated him, they did not even contribute to the 'liberation' of man one step forward: that it is not possible to carry out a real liberation without being in the real world and through real means" (pp. 27-28).

And what would this real world demonstrate to us, which imprisons and submits more than frees the individual, according to Marx? Simply that there can be no liberation, human effectiveness or happiness as long as the division of labor is a concrete fact and an expression synonymous with private property. "Moreover, division of labor and private property are identical; in the former, what is enunciated in relation to the activity is enunciated in the latter in relation to the product of this activity" (idem, p. 39). What makes the division of labor = private property is the fact that property fixes or

freezes the work of those who do not own property, reducing the possibilities of the real exercise of freedom and the experience of satisfaction. "Indeed, from the moment work begins to be divided up, each individual has an exclusive sphere of activity which is imposed on him and from which he cannot leave; he is a hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic and cannot fail to be so if he does not want to lose his means of subsistence... This fixation of social activity, this petrification of our own work into an objective power that dominates us and escapes our control, contradicting our expectations and destroying our desires, is one of the key moments of historical development until our days" (idem, pg. 41). The compartmentalized activity, fixed by the need for survival, is objectively imposed and reveals itself as strange, "natural" (not voluntary), alienating. Alienation would mean, therefore, non-freedom, non-effectiveness, dissatisfaction.

On the other hand, the division of labour must not be confused with the simple division of tasks. Marx distinguishes a primitive division of functions, arising from sex life (following Hegel), a natural division of labor, according to physical capacity and needs, and the division of labor itself. It is the latter that should be kept in mind in the relationship with private property and the social sphere. What would be its characteristics? The separation between manual labor and intellectual labor; the unequal distribution of the quality and quantity of labor products; the contradictions between the individual, the individual family and the collective; the division between city and country, urban and rural. Unlike the fragmentation of specific works within a productive unit (a view that became recurring after Taylor and Friedmann).

And we read in the *Manuscripts* (idem, p. 27): "To affirm that the division of labor and the exchange are based on private property is nothing more than to affirm that labor is the essence of private property, a statement that the economist cannot prove and that we will prove for him. Precisely because the division of labor and exchange are configurations of private property, precisely in this lies the double proof that, on the one hand, human life needed private property and, on the other hand, it now needs the suppression of private property. Since work, in this conception, is the essence of private property, the suppression of private property is therefore an initial condition for its extinction".

Now, is it not commonplace and right to say that Marx saw in work or in the production of the means of life the primary distinction between men and animals? Is it not a fact that he supported and developed the thesis that work is the source of production value? And that expropriation generates forms of surplus value? How can such ideas be made compatible with the suppression of labour? How can we understand passages such as: "Labor is here still the most important power over individuals, and as long as this power exists there will always be private property", or "... the communist revolution is, on the contrary, directed against the previous mode of activity - it suppresses labor"?

Hannah Arendt marvels at such opposition: "...a fundamental contradiction which evokes, as a stigma, all of Marx's thought, and which is present both in the third volume of *The Capital* and in the works of young Marx. Marx's attitude towards work, towards the very focus of his thought, has always been equivocal. Although labor was an eternal necessity imposed by nature and the most human and productive of man's activities, the revolution was not meant to

emancipate the working classes, but to emancipate man from labor; only when labor is abolished can the kingdom of freedom supplant the kingdom of necessity. For the kingdom of freedom begins only where work imposed by necessity and external utility ends, where the empire of immediate physical needs ends... the anguishing alternative between productive slavery and unproductive freedom remains" (The Human Condition, portuguese version, Edusp, 1981, pp. 116-117).

Because it is based on the production and material reproduction of life, and not only on a gnosiological system, although objective, Marx's intention may have been to make explicit an increasingly social character of man. Remembering this basic and, therefore, ontological assumption, "men must be able to live in order to make history. But to live it is necessary, first of all, to drink, to eat, to have a roof to shelter in, to dress in, etc. The first historical fact is, therefore, the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself" (*The German Ideology*, portuguese version, pg. 33).

As a biological being that is necessarily related to nature, there is no possibility of man acting in isolation from this condition, including work as a reproductive and creative activity. However, the man-nature relationship is differentiated from any other biological relationship by the fact that man is a teleological being and that he objectifies or externalizes himself in this bond. We remove from nature the material of our social forms and in this continuous act of withdrawing and teleologically reelaborating and transforming it, as well as ourselves, we create more and more socialized, mediatized and less exclusively natural relationships. This is what Lukács mentions about the ontology of the social being: "... the basic orientation in the improvement of the social being consists precisely in substituting pure natural determinations by mixed ontological forms, explaining later,

from this base, the purely social determinations" (*The Fundamental Ontological Principles of Marx*, portuguese version, Ed. Ciências Humanas, 1979, pg 19).

A classic example would be money as the general equivalent. The exchange value, another example. But, generally speaking, all human institutions are equivalent, to a greater or lesser extent. There is always a natural historical origin in them that has been mediated in a social instance and has evolved or transformed. It has become more complex and has modified man himself and his material and spiritual relationships. In this sense, man is progressively moving away from natural barriers.

Socialization also means that the satisfaction of a natural need, as a result of its exteriorization and the teleological character inscribed in it, creates new forms, instruments and representations, which in turn engenders other mixed (natural and social) needs and other forms of satisfaction. It is through this movement that contradictions can be resolved. "The second point to consider is that, once the first need has been satisfied, the action of satisfying it and the instrument for this lead to new needs - and this production of new needs constitutes the first historical fact" (*The German Ideology*, opus cit. pg. 34).

The contradictions generated by interested action, individual actions and collective needs would be for Marx an obstacle so that human praxis could convert the individual into being fully emancipated and, at the same time, integrated into the social plan. The global investigation of the causes and movement of this emancipation and integration seems to have been one of the focal points of his thought and it can only be based on the real conditions of overcoming such conflict. Private property, labour and its social

division, class conflicts, ideologies and the state have been the main historical manifestations of man and, at the same time, configurations that provoke those conflicts. Such forms should be surpassed in search of autonomy and communion. It is because man is only an *average individual*, and not a total being, one who is capable of projecting himself as totality in the sphere of the generic and reflecting this generality in himself, that he remains attached, limited, self-alienated. The simple choice between freedom and need, between individual and society would be false because it is ineffective, irresolute. The solution could only occur in social man. The synthesis seems clear in the tenth thesis against Feuerbach: "The point of view... of modern materialism is human society or social humanity. It is expressed in the *Manuscripts*: "The social character is, therefore, the general character of the whole movement; just as it is society itself that produces man, so it is produced by him. Activity and jouissance are social, both in their mode of existence and in their content; social activity and social jouissance. The human essence of nature exists only for social man, for only thus does it exist for him as a bond with man, as his mode of existence for the other, and as the other's mode of existence for himself, as a vital element of human effectiveness. Further on: "No matter how much man is a particular individual, and precisely his particularity makes him an individual and an effective individual social being, he is, to the same extent, the totality, the ideal totality, the subjective mode of existence of society thought and felt for himself, in the same way that, in effectiveness, he exists both as intuition and effective enjoyment of the mode of social existence and as a totality of exteriorization of human life".

The anti-capitalist revolution would be a beginning, not the end. "Communism is the necessary configuration and the energy principle

of the near future, but communism is not, as such, the objective of human development, the configuration of human society" (*Manuscripts*, opus cit., pg 16).

The same spirit remains in *The German Ideology*, although one can sense that thought is advancing by encompassing the practical means of material, socioeconomic transformation. "The transformation of personal forces (relationships) into objective forces, through the division of labor, cannot be abolished by extricating from the brain this general representation, but only through a new submission of objective forces and the abolition of the division of labor by individuals. Now, this is not possible without community (and without the complete and free development of the individual that it implies); it is only in community (with others) that each individual has the means to develop his faculty in every sense; personal freedom is therefore only possible in community... In the real community, individuals acquire their freedom simultaneously with their association, thanks to this association and within it" (opus cit; pg 80).

Mentioned the indispensable abolition of the division of labor, Marx goes further: "... while the fugitive serfs only wanted to freely develop their already established conditions of existence and bring them back, but they succeeded, at most, in free labor, the proletarians, if they want to affirm themselves as persons, must abolish their own previous condition of existence, which is, at the same time, that of the whole of society up to the present day, that is, they must abolish labor. For this reason, they are in direct opposition to the form that individuals in society have chosen up to now for expression as a whole, that is, in opposition to the State, and they have to overthrow that State in order to realize their personality" (idem, pp. 82-83).

In the real community, individuals could act as true individuals, externalizing all their senses, needs and enjoyments, that is, destining themselves to other individuals and not to objects or instruments, including work, until today understood as such. If work is not the intended purpose, it cannot remain a central category of human activity. It would constitute the individual himself in his community. Here "the manifestation of self coincides with material life; this phase corresponds to the transformation of individuals into complete individuals and the overcoming of all that was originally imposed by nature [the retreat of natural barriers undertaken by social man - NC]; it corresponds to the transformation of work into manifestation of self and the metamorphosis of relationships hitherto conditioned in relation to individuals as individuals (*The German Ideology*, opus cit; pg. 93). It is under such assumptions that the realm of freedom would be established, whose aim would be to allow the development of the human capacities of the individual.

The gradual change of social forms of work would also result in the transformation of its substance. For how is it possible to call work an activity that contains in itself suffering and strangeness, pain and submission (from the original Latin *tripalium* - plural genitive - instrument to contain animals or even torture, sustained by a tripod – *travail, trabajo, trabalho*), when the action comes from freedom of choice and is aimed at individual satisfaction? When the action can be exteriorized unconditionally or when the inner need can fully transit in the outer sphere?

It is symptomatic in this respect that Hannah Arendt herself issues two different opinions about this utopia in Marx. In a work already mentioned (*The Human Condition*), the author says: "In a completely socialized society, whose only purpose was to sustain the vital

process, and this is the ideal unfortunately somewhat utopian that guides Marx's theories, the distinction between labor and work would disappear completely; all work would become labor, since all things would be conceived not in their mundane and objective quality, but as results of the living force of labor, as functions of the vital process" (pg. 100). Later (to page 143) she states: "The risk that the emancipation from labor in the modern era would not only fail to bring a new era of freedom for all, but, on the contrary, submit to necessity, for the first time, the whole human race, had already been clearly perceived by Marx when he insisted that the goal of the revolution could not be the emancipation of the working classes, already achieved, but the emancipation of man in relation to labor. At first sight, this goal seems utopian, the only utopian element in Marx's teachings".

In a note, however, the philosopher adds: "Marx's society, without class and state, is not utopian. Aside from the fact that modern events show an unmistakable tendency to abolish class distinctions in society and replace the government by that 'administration of things' which, according to Engels, would be the characteristic of socialist society, these ideals, in Marx himself, obviously leaked out into Athenian democracy, with the exception that, in communist society, the privileges of free citizens would be extended to everyone".

Arendt's disbelief thus refers to the possibility of abolishing labour/work. She introduces a striking distinction between labor and work, the former being the continuous effort that "never designates a final product", and the latter, the human artifice that creates more durable objects of renewed use. In the case of labor, we have *homo* (or animal) *laborans*; as for work, *homo faber*. *Labor* is irremediably linked to the need for the maintenance and natural reproduction of life

- such as planting, collecting, herding, hunting, fishing, feeding, conserving of the things we have or produce. *Homo laborans* do not change nature; rather, he cares and shepherds it. *Homo faber*, on the other hand, can only be *homo faber* because he acts with violence and domination (production of objects, instruments and creation of an exclusively human world). For this reason, man's relationship with the world would have become the most abject utilitarianism today. And such utilitarianism would be lost in an "endless chain of means and ends, without ever reaching a principle that can justify the category of means and ends, that is, the category of utility itself".

As a *homo faber*, the human being only relates to another individual and to society in terms of exchange and consumption, that is, only under the economic aspect. Everything is instrumentalized, that is, everything is only used to "obtain something else". Nothing else acquires meaning, except the infernal turnover of exchange and immediate use. Nothing remains as an intrinsic value. No other facet or human quality is important: sensitivity, introspection, human purpose itself. The man, being in today's societies focused exclusively on his vital process, for the *vita activa* (active life), "acquiesces in a functional type of dull and reassured conduct" and runs the risk, in this modern era, of "ending in the most deadly and sterile passivity that history has never known".

If work, in a differentiated community, lost its substance of instrumentalized and often alienating activity; if it started to correspond to the individual's manifestation and not to external systems, processes and interests; if it were dissolved in human action in function of intrinsic values and not as a central and determinant action of life, then there would be no place for the existence of a distinct portion of time and activity or opposed to work, that is, there

would not be what since antiquity is understood as leisure. Work and leisure could be merged, joining existence and essence in a concrete expression of freedom and satisfaction. Only this unit could revive the mythological paradise and pluck its vital selfishness from modern man (as Hannah Arendt calls it); only this new revolution could transform the current society of job-holders and develop, without the bonds and contradictions of technocratic and economic rationality, the only human possibility not yet experienced - their own happiness in life.

Science has unveiled the mysteries of life and nature, but it is still innocuous in revealing its meaning to the man who exercises it. Perhaps it is up to philosophy to transcend the revelation of facts, of what it simply is, and give shape to its meaning. If so, the intimacy between leisure and work, which is also expressed by the annulment of both, can be a first outline of this search and construction.

The Last Obstacle

The perspective of a free human action, that is, unattached to injunctions or still characterized as full disposition of oneself, can run against an insurmountable obstacle (because it is irreducible behind the socio-political life), in a contradiction that is the most natural and profound among all those that subsist between the individual and society. An obstacle that Freud's analysis imposes upon us, as set out in "Civilization and Its Discontents" (*Das Unbehagen in der Kultur* – portuguese version, Standard Edition of Complete Works, Ed. Imago, volume XXI, 1969).

The fundamental question - what men ask of life and what they wish to accomplish in it - has only one answer: happiness. "This attempt has two aspects: a positive and a negative goal. On the one

hand, it aims at an absence of suffering and displeasure: on the other, the experience of intense feelings of pleasure". (pg. 94) This dual pursuit is nothing other than the principle of pleasure. And yet, in order for man to relate to others, that principle is constrained by the reality of civilization, whose characteristics are revealed in order, in repression and in the transference of psychic energy, mainly for the regimentation of work and social institutions. In a somewhat pessimistic way, Freud concludes: "We are inclined to say that the intention that man should be 'happy' is not included in the plans of Creation".

Suffering derives from three factors: from the body itself, condemned to destruction; from the external world (nature), which constantly turns against man and, finally, from our relationships in society. This last suffering is a kind of free but no less fateful addition. Although sublimation at work can compensate for it, "the vast majority of people only work under the pressure of need, and this natural aversion to work raises extremely difficult social problems" (pg. 99, footnote).

The curious thing to be highlighted from this analysis of suffering is that Freud accepts the first two as inevitable processes - those that come from the body and from nature. But not the one generated by civilization: "We do not admit it in any way; we cannot see why the regulations established by ourselves do not represent, on the contrary, protection and benefit for each one of us" (pg. 105). Throughout these pages, Freud investigates the cultural and economic causes of civilization, but the question continues to reappear: "It is not easy to understand how it can be possible to deprive an instinct of satisfaction. It is not done with impunity. It is

difficult to understand how this civilization could act on its participants in any other way than to make them happy" (pp. 118, 121).

The answer, we shall see, is unfortunately not satisfactory. It leads us to a dead end. For together with libido (*Eros*), Freud discovers the destructive and equally instinctive force of aggressiveness and death (*Tanatos*). The unity of man is welded by a polarization between love and violence.

Now, in the primary and innate world of the human psyche, how can civilization and society be influenced in order to inhibit the natural tendency to destruction? By returning the aggressiveness that seeks its external satisfaction back to the ego itself. But in a mediatized way, that is, through the superego, as an internalized authority. No matter in which stage of civilization man lives (with the possible exception of the primitive horde), there will always be a vigilant oppression of guilt, of a severity of others, which translates into renunciation of instinctive satisfactions. From then on, one organizes one's own internal authority and repression. And conscience arises.

The more consciousness or more energy diverted and reworked, the more renunciation before the collectivity, more derivatives, more artificial needs, more culture, more civilization. "Therefore, it is quite conceivable that neither the sense of guilt produced by civilization is perceived as such, and to a great extent remains unconscious, or appears as a kind of discomfort or displeasure (*Unbehagen* - the original title of the work), a dissatisfaction for which people seek other motivations" (pg. 160).

But couldn't the projection of a real community, like the one Marx outlined to us, at least constitute a leniency for such a contradiction of psychic energies? If work (here freely chosen and, therefore, compatible with the very notion of leisure) ceases to "suck" part of

these forces, sublimating them and alienating the individual, would we not approach happiness, a lesser quota of renunciation and suffering?

Once again, Freud's response is cautious. "By abolishing private property, we deprive human love of the aggression of one of its instruments, certainly strong, though certainly not the strongest; but in no way do we alter the differences in power and influence that are misused by aggression, nor do we alter anything in its nature. Aggression was not created by the property" (pg. 135).

Freud's understanding of this "essence" leads him to opt for a principle different from that of Marx. That is, that the aggressiveness of Tanatos is generator and not consequence of private property. However, almost at the end of his tours, Freud nods in the same direction as Marx: "I also think it quite certain that, in this sense, a real change (our emphasis) in the relations of human beings with property would be of much more help than any ethical (and religious) orders for sure; but the recognition of this fact among socialists has been obscured, and rendered useless for practical purposes, by a new and idealistic misconception of human nature" (pg. 169).

What Freud "explains" to us is that socialists still believe, as Rousseau's inheritance, that man is a naturally good animal, energized only by Eros' love.

A radical solution to this basic conflict remains, even today, a mystery.